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CO2 prices will continue to differ from one country to another for a long time, even if a global 
post-Kyoto agreement is achieved in the near future. The non-homogeneous nature of climate policies 
may decrease the competitiveness of some industries with the risk of relocation of activities due to carbon 
leakage. One of most exposed industries in Europe is iron and steel, as it is highly CO2-intensive and 
relatively open to international trade. Most studies estimate a leakage of up to 20% as a consequence of 
all the industrial production activities that are expected to be relocated, and a level of relocation ranging 
from 1.5% to 35%  specifically for the iron and steel sector. This might seem a relatively small 
macroeconomic impact if measured at country or EU level. However, the picture may be quite different if 
the analysis is conducted at sub-national level. Therefore, one could argue that there is an important gap 
in the literature as the relevant studies are applied to a large geographical scale when the fact is that  in 
Europe this industry is highly concentrated in certain specific regions, i.e. the so-called Old Industrial 
Regions (OIR). This paper seeks to analyze the impact that different levels of relocation of the iron and 
steel industry in the OIRs will have as a consequence of climate policy. This is done using an AGE 
(Applied General Equilibrium) model. The results show that although these effects may be diluted from a 
national perspective, the impact for incumbent regions may be very large, and may in fact significantly 
reduce their GDPs. Another important outcome emerges when the costs of CO2 reduction derived from 
industry relocation and from cost-effective policies are compared. Although relocation of industrial 
activity (i.e. forced output change) can reduce CO2, the cost is very high compared with other options 
(e.g. induced input substitution). These results can help national and regional policy makers understand 
the necessary linkages between their environmental and industrial policies. 
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1.   Introduction 
CO2 emissions are being increasingly scrutinized, regulated and priced. Although a post-Kyoto 
agreement is still being negotiated and the Copenhagen meeting left many uncertainties to be 
discussed further in 2010, there is a firm commitment from some developed countries to reduce 
emissions by 2020. For instance, the EU has set the target of reducing its emissions of greenhouse 
gases by 20-30%, Japan is committed to a reduction of 25% and the United States of America (US), 
according to the Markey-Waxman law, to a reduction of 4%. To achieve this, we can expect a battery 
of climate policy measures to be introduced, such as the extension of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU-ETS) to other countries and the implementation of taxes. 
There is an extensive body of literature focusing on the economics of CO2 control at global 
level (Nordhaus 2009, Stern 2009, World Bank 2007), at country level (Strachan and Kannan 2009) 
and even at regional level (Gonzalez-Eguino and Dellink 2007). However, given the stringency of the 
policies required and the differences between countries, a growing literature is now examining how 
these asymmetries in climate and energy policies can affect competitiveness (Hauser et al 2008, Smale 
et al 2006, IEA 2005).  
The concept of competitiveness can be very complex (Porter 1990, Krugman 1994). In the 
context of climate policy it refers mainly to the risk that, like any other factor or commodity, the price 
of CO2 could affect the profits and output of some firms. One of the main concerns in the EU in 
regard to establishing more stringent cuts in emissions within the ETS, or auctioning more permits 
instead of grandfathering them, has been precisely the fear of losing competitiveness in some 
industries. This discussion is at the heart of the new Directive 2009/29/CE of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 April 2009, amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community. Although there could be some 
benefits in being a leader in a carbon constrained world, it also entails costs in terms of the risk of 
relocation of some of the more energy and CO2 intensive production sectors. Most equilibrium 
modelling estimates an economy-wide leakage from Kyoto action in the order of 5 to 20% (World 
Bank 2007, IPCC 2007). That is, for every five tonnes of CO2 cut in a country with a climate policy, 
one additional tonne will be emitted elsewhere. Thus, it becomes very important to understand who 
the winners and losers will be in the carbon leakage phenomenon. 
The iron and steel industry, which is included in the ETS, is one of the most exposed industries 
in Europe to carbon leakage, since it is both highly CO2-intensive and relatively open to international 
trade (Hourcade et al 2008). The European Commission is aware of this exposure, and included iron 




There is, however, an important gap in the literature. So far, all the studies that have looked into 
the impacts of carbon leakage in the iron and steel industry have done so on a large geographical scale, 
either at country level (Japan, US, China) or at supra-national level (UE-27, Asia). This means that an 
important feature of this sector is omitted: the fact that from its origin this industry has been highly 
concentrated in specific regions (the so-called Old Industrial Regions, OIR), as can be seen from the 
. Moreover, this sector is very significant in terms of GDP for many countries and 
regions.  
In 2005 the iron and steel industry accounted for around 16% of total production in the EU-27, 
20% of final energy consumption and 25% of total emissions from the manufacturing sector. The 
average cost of steel production in the EU-27 is 10–20% higher than the avedrage for the rest of the  
world, and up to 30-40% higher than in countries with easy access to abundant iron ore and cheap 
energy, such as Brazil or Russia (Hourcade et al 2008). This price gap has been sustainable with stable 
production in OECD countries since the eighties for three main reasons: (1) the growth of aggregate 
consumption in the last ten years; (2) the specialisation and quality standard requirements for many 
products; and (3) the creation of close business relationships with local sectors, such as construction 
and automotive manufacturers. In any case, there is no doubt that that the iron and steel industry faces 
new challenges in the coming decade from globalisation and from climate policy.   
Some studies have focused specifically on the impact of the CO2 price in the iron and steel 
sector. Gielen and Moriguchi (2002) develop a large scale partial equilibrium model (STEAP model), 
that covers the life cycle analysis (LCA) of many different technology options. They find that if 
Europe and Japan alone introduced such a tax, their CO2 emissions would indeed decline, but that 
lower production in these regions would be offset by increased production and emissions elsewhere. 
They show that a tax of $12-50/tCO2 would reduce steel production by 20-35% by 2020 and generate 
a leakage rate of 35-50%. An OECD report (OECD 2002) also concludes that a unilaterally-applied 
carbon tax of $ 25/tCO2 in EU-13 (excluding Finland and Sweden) would lead to a 12% reduction in 
steel output and a leakage rate of 60%. Hidalgo et al. (2002) find, with a world steel industry model 
(ISIM model) based on the partial equilibrium model POLES, that a 2-5% per cent relocation of 
production from the EU-15 is expected for a € 20-50/tCO2 price by 2030. Finally, Demailly and 
Quirion (2008) apply a “small” partial equilibrium model that uses marginal abatement costs (MAC) 
from “large” models (POLES, PRIMES and MARKAL). They measure the two key dimensions of 
competitiveness  –  production and profitability –  and conclude that for this sector losses in 
competitiveness will be small. Results from their reference scenario show a decrease in production of 
1.5% and a leakage rate of 5% for a price of 20 €/tCO2.  
                                                   
2 The COMMISSION DECISION of 24 December 2009 draws up, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a 




2.  The Basque Country as an Old Industrial Region in Europe 
. For instance, in Spain it is mainly concentrated in the Basque Country, and in 
the UK in Wales and North-West England. This adds extra importance to comprehending the impacts 
and learning who the losers will be.  
The OIR are regions that were at the vanguard of early industrialisation in the European 
economy, for reasons related to cheap access to raw materials such as iron ore, carbon and coke, and 
much of their activity continues to centre on heavy industry and energy intensive sectors. The key 
drivers of these OIR economies are normally the production of capital goods and infrastructure 
industries such as iron and steel, shipbuilding, heavy engineering and railway engineering, which are 
normally highly interconnected. The relocation of any one of these industries could have an important 
knock-on effect on others that should also be taken into account. In fact, it would also affect the cost-
effectiveness of climate policy as it would increase the cost of CO2 mitigation policies. It must be 
taken into account that energy efficiency has improved “dramatically” in the European iron and steel 
industry in the last ten years, so further major improvements will prove very difficult and costly. That 
is, the marginal costs of further improvements are significantly high and growing (Eurofer 2000). 
This paper seeks to analyse the impact of the carbon leakage and relocation phenomenon on a 
geographical scale better suited to the intrinsic characteristics of the iron and steel industry. The 
analysis centres on the Basque Country; an OIR that produces 10% of EU’s total output from Electric 
Arc Furnace (EAF) mills. To account for economy-wide effects we use an AGE (Applied General 
Equilibrium) model. The results show that although total effects may be diluted from a national 
perspective, the impact on the region may be large and may significantly reduce its GDP. The article 
also calculates the maximum benefit that could be obtained if the government implemented the 
measures that would be needed to prevent delocalisation from happening as a side-effect of a globally 
asymmetric climate policy. The results show an enormous gap between the implicit cost of relocation-
related emission reductions and emission reductions through a cost effective policy.  
The paper is structured in five sections. After this introduction, Section 2 outlines the main 
features of the Basque Country as an OIR. The AGE model is presented in Section 3. Section 4 sets 
out the main results of the analysis. Section 5 draws conclusions and lists some limitations and 
possible extensions of the study. 
 
Old Industrial Regions (OIR) are generally the most critical places in Europe in the face of the 
prospect of a low carbon economy. OIRs (Birth et al 2009) are regions (see Figure 1
4
                                                   
3 http://www.eurofer.org/index.php/eng/Facts-Figures/European-Steel-Map 
4 The regions are based upon NUTS2 designations from Eurostat as shown in Table A6 in the appendices.  
) that were at the 5 
 
forefront of early industrialisation in the European economy, geared to the exploitation of coal and 
other raw materials, and more importantly a (comparatively) high proportion of their activity remains 
focused on heavy industry and energy intensive sectors. The key drivers of these economies are the 
production of capital goods and infrastructure industries such as iron and steel, shipbuilding, heavy 
engineering and railway engineering. Despite slow progress and efforts to diversify (e.g. towards high-
tech and service sectors) these regions continue to rely upon these traditional sectors. 
Figure 1: Old Industrial Regions in the Largest European States 
 
Source: Birch, Mackinnon and Cumbers (2009) 
 Table 1 shows the trend in industrial employment from 1996 to 2007. It can be seen that, along 
with two regions in France and two in Germany, the Basque Country in Spain is one of the few 
regions in Europe that has managed to maintain the weight of industrial employment at the significant 
25% level in the last ten years. 
The Basque region is currently one of the wealthiest regions in Spain, with a gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita around 25% higher than the national average. The main economic activities 
in the Basque Country have long been the steel and shipbuilding industries, mainly due to the rich iron 
ore resources found around Bilbao in the 19th century. The Estuary of Bilbao was the centre of the 
Basque Country's industrial revolution in  the 19th century and the first half of the 20th. These 
activities went into decline in the recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, giving rise to a deep, convulsive 
restructuring of industry and the development of new technology-intensive activities and the service 
sector. Although the share of industry in total activity has decreased over the last 30 years, it is still 
high compared with other regions in Europe (see Figure 2) in terms of GDP, and the strongest 
industries are currently iron and steel, machine-tools, vehicle making, wind turbines, rolling stock and 
railways. 
The Basque Country has one of the highest concentrations of iron and steel producers in Europe 
(see Table 2) and a large processing industry which produces a wide range of steel products, especially 6 
 
long products, stainless steel and specialty steels. This sector accounts for nearly 50% of steel 
production in Spain and 10% of all the steel produced in Europe with EAF technology. It should also 
be noted that all the iron and steel produced in the Basque Country uses this technology. Total 
production of raw steel in 2005 in Spain was 17.8 million tonnes, of which the Basque Country 
produced 6.9 million tonnes. This is a highly significant proportion considering that the Basque 
Country accounts for around 6% of Spain’s overall GDP. The production of steel in the Basque 
Country can even be compared directly with some whole countries; its output is similar to that of 
Australia (7.6 million tonnes), the Netherlands (6.9), the Czech Republic (6.4) and Greater Indonesia 
(3.6).  In fact, there are only 24 countries in the world that produce more steel than the Basque 
Country. The steel industry  provides 23,188 direct jobs in the Basque Country (2.5% of total 
employment) and accounts for 5.9% of Basque GDP. 
Table 1: % of employment in industry 1996-2007  
Country  NUTS 2 Region  1996  2001  2007  % 96-07 
Germany      24.0  23.6  22.6  -6.0 
   Düsseldorf  24.7  22.3  21.0  -15.2 
   Münster  23.8  22.1  25.1  5.2 
   Arnsberg  29.6  27.8  25.9  -12.7 
   Saarland  23.3  22.9  18.9  -18.6 
Spain     18.7  18.8  15.5  -17.1 
   Basque Country  26.4  27.5  23.2  -12.1 
France     18.5  18.6  15.9  -14.1 
   Nord-Pas-de-Calais  24.5  26.2  24.0  -1.9 
   Picardie  22.2  21.1  16.9  -24.0 
   Lorraine  21.4  23.3  24.8  16.0 
United Kingdom  19,2  16.3  12.9  -33.2 
   Tees Valley and Durham  23.9  22.0  15.3  -35.9 
   Northumberland, Tyne and Wear  20.5  17.1  12.8  -37.5 
   Lancashire  25.0  23.6  16.0  -35.8 
   South Yorkshire  21.6  18.9  13.8  -36.2 
   Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire  26.4  22.1  17.1  -35.1 
   Shropshire and Staffordshire  26.9  23.3  15.5  -42.3 
   West Wales and The Valleys  22.1  17.9  15.0  -32.2 
   South Western Scotland  20.1  14.5  10.8  -46.3 
Source: Eurostat, Regions – Economic Accounts, NACE D classification 
 
From 1990 to 2005 steel production grew by 10% while direct emissions of CO2 resulting from 
the production process decreased from 3760 tCO2 to 1235 tCO2. This change is attributable to 
industrial restructuring and technological change (Ansuategi and Arto,  2004).  After the industrial 
restructuring of the nineteen eighties, integrated steelmaking plants were closed and replaced entirely 
by several new Electric Arc Furnace (EAF) facilities. Currently all the steel produced in the region is 
made in mini-mills with EAF technology. This made it possible to increase production while 
considerably decreasing energy consumption. On average, these are the least CO2 intensive plants in 7 
 
the world (see Figure 3). Thus, energy efficiency in the iron and steel industry in the Basque Country 
is very close to the current limits of technology and could only be substantially improved by new 
processes or innovations. 
Figure 2: % value added by sector, Basque Country, 1980-2009 
 




Table 2: % of output by region and sector, 2005 
   Basque Country  Spain   EU-27 
Agriculture, Fishing and Mining   1.2%  3.5%  2.7% 
Industry   26.6%  15.8%  17.3% 
Iron and Steel Industry    8.9%  2.6%  2.4% 
Energy  3.0%  2.0%  2.1% 
Construction  8.9%  11.5%  6.0% 
Transport and communications  7.0%  6.9%  7.0% 
Services  53.3%  60.2%  64.9% 
Total  100%  100%  100% 







Figure 3: Carbon intensity of steel, 2005 (tonnes of CO2 per tonne of steel) 
 
Source: ISSI (2005) and UNESID (2008) 
 
 
3.  The model 
This section presents the main characteristics of the static version of the AGE model used. 
Appendix A contains the algebraic formulation of the model. AGE models are empirical versions of a 
Walrasian model which enable interdependencies between different economic agents to be taken into 
consideration. An introduction to general equilibrium models can be found in Shoven and Whalley 
(1992). 
 
3.1. General description  
The model comprises (1) 19 production sectors; (2) a representative consumer; (3) a 
government which collects taxes, supplies goods and services and monitors CO2 emissions; and (4) 
the "Rest of the World", an aggregate that brings together the foreign sector. Primary factors include 
labour and capital. Labour and capital are mobile across economic sectors, but cannot move between 
regions. Some particularities are introduced to model the iron and steel industry (see Subsection 3.2).  
The choice of production sectors pays specific attention to energy goods/sectors (coal, natural 
gas, crude oil, refined oil products and electricity). The iron and steel industry is separated from the 
metal products industry. This allows us to split the production of steel, responsible for most CO2 
emissions, from the manufacturing and processing of these products. The rest of the production sectors 
include major CO2 emitting activities (wood and paper, cement and transport) and other sectors with 
























Cost functions are derived from nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
functions, which represent profit maximizing behaviour. Production functions are employed to specify 
the substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital, labour, energy and other 
intermediate inputs. At a second level, another CES function describes the substitution possibilities 
between labour, capital and the energy composite. At a third level, an energy composite trade-off is 
captured through a CES function of electricity and fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) as shown in Figure 4. 
The only exception to this type of structure is the iron and steel industry, which is implemented with a 
Leontief Function. This is due to the fact that all the steel in the Basque Country is produced with EAF 
technology and the scope for technological changes capable of reducing CO2 emissions is very small. 
 
Figure 4: Output function structure 
 
Source: MIT-EPPA model (Babiker et al 2005) 
Final private demand for goods and services is derived from utility maximisation of a 
representative household subject to a budget constraint. The total income of the representative 
household consists of factor income and transfers. The final demand of the representative agent is 
given as a CES composite of an energy aggregate and a non-energy consumption composite. 
Substitution patterns within the energy aggregate and the non-energy consumption bundle are reflected 
via Cobb-Douglas functions following Figure 5. In our comparative-static framework, investment 









Figure 5: Utility function structure 
 
Source: MIT-EPPA model (Babiker et al 2005) 
The government provides public goods, which are produced with commodities purchased at 
market prices, and distributes transfers. The preferences of the government are modelled via a Leontief 
function that enables the structure of public spending to be kept fixed with policy simulations. The 
government obtains its income through taxes on capital and labour (and additional income when it 
auctions CO2 emission permits). The level of public spending remains constant. 
All commodities are traded internationally. We assume that (a) the domestic economy is too 
small to influence world-wide prices; and (b) import and export requirements can be met by trade with 
the Rest of the World. We also apply the so-called Armington assumption (Armington 1969), which 
means that domestic and imported/exported goods are imperfect substitutes. In practice, this means 
modelling total supply as a CES function that aggregates domestic output and imports; and total 
demand by means of a transformation function which breaks down that aggregate into domestic 
demand and exports. Finally, as a "closure rule”, we assume that the trade deficit, i.e. imports minus 
exports, is constant. 
The total supply of labour and capital is considered to be exogenous. However, it is important to 
specify a relationhip  between investment and capital flows. In a dynamic context the level of 
investment in an economy depends on interest rates, on the capital stock and on depreciation. As these 
points cannot be incorporated into a static model, we assume that the initial capital stock is adjusted 
following the condition that the price of investment in equilibrium must be equal to the price of 
capital. Thus, investment decisions are at least consistent with the return of capital (Hayashi 1982). 
Finally, the conventional Walrasian concept of equilibrium is used: the quantities supplied are 
equal to the quantities demanded, prices act as adjustment variables and all agents comply with their 




3.2. Modelling the relocation of iron and steel production 
Iron and steel production is modelled using a Leontief production function (LT), which means 
that there are no substitution possibilities between inputs (see Equation 1). This assumption is 
consistent with the fact that the production technology for steel production in the Basque Country is 
100% based on EAF technology, which means that although some CO2 reduction would be possible 
through energy efficiency and fuel switching, most of it would have to be found in changes in the 
production process. . Steel output ( ) is obtained by combining in a fixed proportion of intermediate 
inputs ( ), capital ( ) and labour ( , where j=1...J represent production sectors in the economy 
and S is the iron and steel industry (the 11
th j). 
 
  (1) 
 
In order to include the relocation of iron and steel production in our model we assume that: (1) 
relocation is determined exogenously accordingly to the estimations used in the relevant literature; (2) 
the reduction in production due to relocation is perfectly substituted with imports from ROW; and (3) 
the proportion of capital related to the loss in production moves to ROW, thus reducing the capital 
stock.  
The first assumption is reflected in equation 2, where production is exogenously determined (
) by the level of relocation of iron and steel production ( ) which fixes the proportion of 
reduction with respect to the benchmark level ( ).  
 
  (2) 
 
The second assumption is represented by equation 3.1. Since we are using the Armington 
assumption to model trade (see the trade block of equations in Appendix A),  this assumption can be 
captured considering perfect elasticity of substitution ( ) between iron and steel production 
( and imports  , which in turn will make it possible to maintain total supply ( ) constant, as 
expressed in 3.2. 
 
  (3.1) 12 
 
 
         (3.2) 
 
Finally, the third assumption is expressed in equation 4. Since technology in the iron and steel 
industry is represented through an LT function, any reduction in production  any reduction in 
production   should be proportional to the reduction in capital ), according to the exogenous 
parameter  . Therefore, the capital stock or endowment ( , i.e. the sum of all the capital allocated in 
the J sectors of the economy, will be reduced in the same proportion as the loss in capital due to  
relocation of activity in the iron and steel industry. 




3.3. Modelling CO2 emissions and the emission trading market  
CO2 emissions from sector j ( ) are calculated by multiplying emission coefficients 
( ) and intermediate consumption levels of coal, oil and gas (noted by the subscript e). As 
emissions from the residential sector are not considered, total emissions ( ) are the sum of the 
emissions from all the sectors in the economy (see Equation. 5). 
   
  (5) 
    The restriction in CO2 emissions (see Subsection 4.3) is implemented with a market 
for tradable emission permits.  The government sets the number of permits for each period, auctions 
them and allows them to be traded freely on the market. Thus, permits are just another production 
factor (which is linked directly to CO2 emissions) that reaches an equilibrium price via interaction of 
supply and demand. This is a natural way of simulating the cost of CO2 abatement in AGE models 
(Dellink 2005).  13 
 
Therefore, a restriction in emissions can be simulated by reducing the number of initial emission 
permits ( )  as shown in equation 6. We assume an equal yield tax reform, that is, the 
additional income collected by the government from controls on CO2 emissions is transferred directly 
to consumers, so that the level of public spending remains constant,. In these circumstances, each 
agent has an incentive to use the best mitigation options available (substitution of inputs, changes in 
patterns of consumption, capital investment to reduce emissions, downscaling of economic activity, 
etc) so that the marginal cost of reducing pollution by one additional unit will be the same as the price 
of that unit. 
  (6) 
                  
3.4. Calibration 
The initial equilibrium data come from an SAM drawn up by integrating
5 the data from the 
Symmetric Input Output Table (Eustat 2005) and the data from energy balance sheets for each sector 
(EVE 2005). The integration of these two tables reveals the underlying energy flows in the Input 
Output Table, so that CO2 emissions can then be calculated.
6
4.  Results  
 The reaction of agents to changes is 
reflected through elasticities of substitution from the MIT-EPPA model (Babiker et al 2001) and 
emissions are calculated via the standard coefficients for coal, oil and gas. The model is programmed 
using GAMS/MPSGE language and solved with the PATH algorithm (Dirkse and Ferris 1995).  
 
 
4.1. General Results  
Most of the studies in  the  relevant  literature consider losses from relocation in terms of 
production losses in the sector involved. Macroeconomic consequences are small enough to remain 
diluted at a state level. However, in an OIR steel production is concentrated  enough to have 
consequences within the region that can be measured in terms of GDP losses. Understanding who the 
winners and losers in climate policy will be is vital for designing an effective policy.  
                                                   
5 Energy data are integrated by inserting new rows into the IO Table for demand for energy goods (crude oil, 
coal, oil, gas and electricity) originating from the multiplication of the physical data and prices for energy 
balance sheets using the procedure described in Rutherford and Paltsev (2000). 
6 The database used to draw up the SAM is the symmetric IO Table from Eustat (Basque Statistics Office), so the 
data are valued at basic prices. Tax on labour includes social security contributions payable by workers. All 
remaining taxes are grouped under a tax on capital.  14 
 
Figure 6 shows the link between steel output reduction and gross domestic product (GDP). The 
quasi-linear form of this function indicates that the costs will increase proportionally as the level of 
relocation increases. This relationship can be explained by the fact that i) the iron and steel industry is 
modelled with an LT structure; and ii) the possibility of substitution between materials and the 
Energy-Capital-Labour composite is zero (see Figure 4 and Table A6). The figure shows that a 
relocation of this activity of between 0 and 50% means a drop in GDP that may come close to 4%. 
This result reflects not only the direct impact of relocation but also its indirect effects. 
Figure 6: Economic impact of the relocation of the iron and steel industry 
 
Table 3 shows the results broken down according to general variables, sector-related variables 
and energy-related variables for three exogenous relocation levels of reduction: 1.5%, 15% and 
35%
7.The results show a drop in utility, GDP, consumption and investment. Utility, an indicator of 
loss of welfare, drops by between 0.05% and 1.62% and GDP by between 0.09% and 2.26%. GDP 
reduction reflects the trend in consumption and investment, since public spending and the foreign 
trade deficit are constant. The fall in consumption is due to a reduction in the value of endowments 
owned by consumers, as part of the capital stock is lost on relocation. On the other hand the sectors 
most affected are capital intensive, so flows of investment
8
Table 3 also includes the effects on the economic structure, with the data aggregated under 
Agriculture, Industry and Services. The results show a high impact on Industry (-2.62% for a 15% 
relocation) due to the strong linkages of iron and steel with other industries. For high levels of 
relocation of the iron and steel industry, indirect effects also extend into Agriculture and Services
 are also reduced.  
9
                                                   
7 These relocation levels are in line with those estimated in the relevant literature. 
8 It must be pointed out as a caveat of the analysis that in a static model it is not possible to reflect how future 
economic growth will be affected by lower levels of investment. 
. 
9 It is also worth mentioning that, although the impact on economic activity in services amounts to a reduction of 
not quite 1%, given the high share of total output represented by commercial and non commercial services 15 
 
The model allows for shifts of resources from one sector to another due to the possibilities of 
substitution in the output and utility functions. As we show in the following subsections, these 
substitution effects are the mechanisms by which economic activity is partially channelled towards 
less energy intensive sectors.  
Another significant effect that can be measured is the impact on energy consumption. On the 
one hand, the relocation of the iron and steel industry induces a change that is proportional to the 
energy mix of the industry. Given that in the Basque Country iron and steel production is based 
entirely on EAF technology that consumes coal, gas and electricity, these are the energy inputs that 
show the highest reduction rates. On the other hand, the energy mix is also altered by the fact that 
most indirect effects affect heavy industry, which consumes more coal. In the case of a 15% relocation 
of the iron and steel industry, coal consumption is reduced by 3.4%, oil by 1%, gas by 2.8% and 
electricity by 2.7%. Oil shows the lowest impact, due to the fact that the transport sector is not highly 
affected by the relocation of the iron and steel industry.  
Table 3: General Results (%) for different levels of relocation of iron and steel production  
Scenarios  -1,5%  -15%  -35% 
General        
Utility   -0,05  -0,59  -1,62 
GDP  -0,09  -0,92  -2,26 
Consumption  -0,05  -0,59  -1,62 
Investment  -0,19  -1,82  -4,25 
Sectors       
Agriculture  -0,04  -0,40  -0,93 
Industry  -0,27  -2,62  -5,66 
Services  -0,15  -0,31  -1,02 
Energy Consumption       
Coal  -0,36  -3,43  -7,36 
Oil  -0,10  -1,01  -1,40 
Gas  -0,29  -2,82  -6,34 
Electricity  -0,27  -2,70  -6,06 
Others       
Iron and Steel Output  1,50  15,00  35,00 
CO2 emissions reduction  -0,23  -2,23  -4,42 
Implicit cost of CO2 (€/Tco2)  187,8  191,9  202,1 
 
The model estimates that a relocation of iron and steel production of between 5% and 35% 
would entail reductions in CO2 emissions of between 0.23% and 4.42% (100 to 705 KtCO2). This 
effect captures both the direct reduction of CO2 emissions in the iron and steel industry and their 
indirect reduction in other sectors. Figure 7 shows a disaggregation of the two effects and highlights 
                                                                                                                                                               
(25.8% and 10.6 % respectively according to Table A5) the impact on output through services is by no means 
negligible. 16 
 
the importance of taking into account the indirect effects. The indirect reduction of CO2 accounts for 
almost half of the total effect.  
 
Figure 7: CO2 variation for different relocation scenarios 
 
 
The reduction of CO2 emissions could be considered a positive outcome of the relocation of the 
iron and steel industry, since it results in less need for emissions allowances. For a price of 20€/TCO2 
this would mean a saving of 2M€ to 14.1M€. However, if the real cost of this reduction in terms of 
GDP loss  is examined  the picture changes dramatically. To reduce emissions by 0.23-4.42% via 
relocation of the iron and steel industry, GDP would have to fall by between 0.09% and 2.26%. This 
means a total loss in Basque GDP of between 470 M € and 1686 M €. The real cost paid per unit of 
CO2 reduction is therefore between 187 €/Tco2 and 202 €/Tco2.   
Finally, it should be noted that if this steel is produced elsewhere, global CO2 emissions may 
well increase since developing countries emit on average twice as much CO2 per unit of production of 
steel as OIRs.  
 
4.2 Results by sectors  
One of the advantages of AGE models is that they allow each scenario to be analysed at sector 
level.  In doing this we should take into account that in an AGE model the inputs are exogenous, so 
changes in sectors should be understood as shifts of resources from some sectors to others that have 
become less profitable due to an exogenous shock or restriction.  
In our case, the main effect comes from the fact that a relocation of iron and steel production 
reduces the inputs that this sector uses. Thus, in the first round the energy sector and commercial 17 
 
services are the two sectors affected most, since these are the main components of the costs of 
production (see Table A2) and there are no substitution possibilities within the iron and steel industry. 
In the second round the impacts are more complex. The sectors affected most are those that produce 
goods that consume energy and commercial services, with the particularity that in all these sectors 
there are some substitution possibilities (see Figures 4 and 5). Finally, since the production and final 
demand of some goods change, consumers also change their consumption structure in order to 
maximise their utility. Table 4 shows the effects of the three scenarios considered. As might be 
expected, the sectors affected most are those closely related to energy: natural gas, electricity and 
other industries.  
Table 4: Results by sectors (%) for different levels of relocation of iron and steel production  
   1.5%  15%  35% 
Agriculture  -0.04  -0.40  -0.93 
Mineral extraction  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Food and textile industry  -0.03  -0.26  -0.61 
Wood & paper industry   -0.03  -0.26  -0.60 
Oil refining industry  -0.10  -1.04  -2.42 
Chemical industry  -0.02  -0.19  -0.44 
Glass industry  -0.01  -0.06  -0.14 
Cement industry  -0.05  -0.47  -1.09 
Iron and Steel industry  -1.50  -15.00  -35.00 
Metal products industry  0.00  -0.02  -0.05 
Other industries  -0.19  -1.89  -4.41 
Electricity  -0.29  -2.88  -6.73 
Natural gas  -0.31  -3.08  -7.20 
Construction  -0.19  -0.85  -2.33 
Transport  -0.06  -0.61  -1.43 
Commercial services  -0.06  -0.56  -1.30 
Non commercial services  -0.01  -0.14  -0.32 
 
4.3. A comparative analysis with a cost-effective mitigation policy 
Previous sections of the paper have analysed the impact of different scenarios of relocation of 
the  iron and steel industry. This relocation, which we assume could be a consequence of climate 
policy, would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a certain amount. In this section we look at the 
economic impact of achieving CO2 reductions if a cost-effective policy is used, i.e. if a reduction in 
emissions is attained with the minimum cost (see Subsection 3.3). In other words, the aim of this 
section is to compare the cost of CO2 reduction in a situation where inputs and economic structure can 
be adapted endogenously (see Table 5) with the situation when the reduction of emissions comes from 
an exogenous change (a reduction in the output of the iron and steel industry due to relocation) in the 
economic structure (see Table 3).  
Comparing these two situations will give us an indication of the maximum benefits that could 
be obtained if the government implemented the necessary measures to guarantee that no production is 
taken overseas. This, of course, is indicative of the amount of resources that should/could be devoted 18 
 
to preventing relocation  from  happening. Or, looking at the issue in a different way, it can be 
interpreted as the increase in the cost of reducing GHG emissions that could occur as a consequence of 
a policy that generates carbon leakage. 
Figure 7 shows this relationship between CO2 reduction and GDP loss. A straightforward result 
is that reducing CO2 emissions has a cost in terms of GDP when CO2 is priced compared to a 
situation in which there are no constraints or costs in place. Moreover, the convexity of this function 
(explained by the CES function adopted and the possibilities of substitution between energy inputs) 
indicates that costs will increase disproportionately as the level of reductions increases and the best 
mitigation options are exhausted. However, note that although this could be considered as similar to a 
“least cost” function of CO2 reductions, other options apart from a fuel switch are not considered 
(which would decrease costs) and nor are market failures and transaction costs (which would increase 
them). 
Figure 7: Mitigation costs for a cost-effective policy 
 
 
Table 5 shows the results for CO2 reductions of 5%, 25% and 50%. According to the model, 
utility, GDP, consumption and investment will all fall as a consequence of this policy (by 0.74%, 0.7% 
and 1.82% for the  25% emission reduction scenario). Table 5 also reveals some effects on the 
economic structure, with a shift towards the service sector which is reduced by a smaller proportion. 
Another significant point is the impact on energy consumption. Note that the policy induces a change 
that is to some extent proportional to the carbon content of each fuel used to generate energy. That is, 
for a reduction of 25% in emissions coal consumption is reduced by 49%, oil by 11%, gas by 3.3% 
and electricity by 5.6%. Note that the reduction in electricity use is the result of an indirect effect (the 





Table 5: General results (%) for different levels of reduction of CO2 emissions 
Scenarios  -5%  -25%  -50% 
General           
Utility   -0.06  -0.74  -3.68 
GDP  -0.10  -1.00  -4.35 
Consumption  -0.06  -0.72  -3.52 
Investment  -0.20  -1.82  -7.08 
Sectoral           
Agriculture  -0.18  -1.95  -7.89 
Industry  -0.28  -2.35  -8.46 
Services  -0.01  -0.23  -1.29 
Energy Consumption          
Coal  -10.52  -49.02  -78.54 
Oil  -1.53  -11.08  -30.12 
Gas  -0.17  -3.37  -16.12 
Electricity  -0.68  -5.67  -19.51 
Others          
CO2 emissions  -5.00  -25.00  -50.00 
Iron and Steel Output  0.46  -3.56  -14.47 
Implicit cost of CO2 (€/Tco2)  62.6  125.2  273.2 
 




A comparison of Tables 3 and 5 gives an indication of the cost of reducing emissions in both 
situations.  The implicit cost of a 5% reduction in emissions as a consequence of relocation of 20 
 
industrial activity is around 200 €/tCO2, whereas in a cost-effective policy this figure could be 
obtained for the much lower cost of 62.5 €/tCO2. For an emission reduction cost of 200 €/tCO2 
emissions would be reduced by close to 50%. This enormous cost gap (which can be seen in Figure 8) 
can be clearly observed through the effect of relocation on the true source of emissions: fossil fuels. 
Figure 9 shows how in a cost-effective emission reduction the energy mix changes in proportion to the 
carbon content of each fuel. However in the case of relocation this logic does not hold, because the 
fuels which are cut most are reduced mainly as a function of the energy structure of the iron and steel 
industry. 




The trend in  global climate policy after Copenhagen will determine many of the economic 
impacts derived from this policy. Whether an overall CO2 pricing scheme should be implemented 
internationally is a key question that needs to be answered in the coming years. Furthermore, it should 
be clarified what policy instruments will be used and where will they be implemented. 
With regard to European climate policy, the new Directive 2009/29/CE seems to suggest that 
the ETS will continue in place. It also implies that the ETS will require changes in order to prevent 
undesired potential effects through relocation in some sectors. The European Commission is fully 
aware that an asymmetric global climate policy might generate negative effects in terms of 
competitiveness and could lead to the so-called carbon leakage phenomenon. Thus, it is extremely 
important to fully understand who the “winners” and the “losers” in the policy will be. This paper 
argues that analysis at a national scale might fail to reveal the importance of the impacts of relocation 
of the iron and steel industry in OIRs. 21 
 
The results of the AGE model developed to estimate these impacts in the Basque economy show 
that for a rate of relocation ranging from 1.5% to 35% the total loss in terms of GDP for that region 
may be as much as 2.26 %. This is clearly a very serious economic impact that cannot be fully 
appreciated in studies conducted at a national or supra-national geographical scale.  
But carbon leakage may have another undesired and significant effect:  an  increase in CO2 
emission reduction costs. The paper shows that if the reduction in emissions is achieved through some 
degree of relocation of the iron and steel industry, then the cost of mitigation may rise to 200 €/tonne 
(see Table 3), whereas the same reduction can be achieved for 62.5 €/tonne (see Table 5) if an efficient 
carbon emission trading scheme is used
10
It should be noted, however, that these results do not call for any type of new protectionism. 
They  suggest that ETS policy can be a very effective instrument if carefully designed to avoid 
negative impacts in OIRs. The new Directive tries to do this and decision makers should understand 
why this is so important. A policy that generates relocation in some sectors will have noticeable, 
important impacts in terms of GDP, consumption and investment
.  
Many different policy recommendations could be drawn from this analysis. In our view, the 
most important conclusion is that when designing climate policy special attention should be paid to the 
burden imposed on  sectors prone to relocation. More specifically, we believe  that environmental 
policy applied to industrial sectors such as the iron and steel industry, which are concentrated in just a 
few regions in Europe, should be the subject of careful design. These are usually sectors in which 
there is little room for further improvements in energy efficiency. Additional  measures should be 
incorporated when needed to avoid or offset  the undesired impacts of asymmetric global climate 
policy in OIRs.   
11
Some caveats should be taken into account in order to put these results into perspective. First, 
there is still considerable uncertainty concerning the size of the relocation effect driven by changes in 
CO2 prices. We have chosen different scenarios within the range of estimates found in the literature, 
but that range is probably too wide. Second, the model is based on perfectly competitive markets and 
perfectly mobile factors between sectors. It considers direct and indirect impacts but does not include 
other costs such as transaction or adaptation costs. It is also important to recall that rigidities in labour 
. Paradoxically, such a policy will 
make efforts to reduce CO2 extremely expensive. 
                                                   
10 In fact, the range of cost per tonne of CO2 obtained from relocation would be by far the highest of any 
technological measure available to mitigate emissions. IEA, for example, predicts that capture and storage (CCS) 
technology would cost in the range of 35 to 60$ per tonne of CO2 by 2030 and McKinsey foresees a price in the 
range of 30 to 45$. Even the most expensive measures for mitigating CO2 emissions, which are related to 
transformation of the transport sector and development of alternative fuels and vehicles, would not, according to 
IEA estimates, exceed 150 € per tonne of CO2. 
11In this paper we only consider relocation of one of the vulnerable sectors listed in Directive 2009/29/EC. If all 
such sectors were considered the aggregate impacts would be much greater. 22 
 
markets are not included, which could be relevant in the short term. Third, there are also caveats 
concerning the trade specification. As usual  in the relevant  literature, we use the Armington 
assumption, considering a multi-regional specification of the model to be beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
We conclude by  suggesting some interesting areas for further research. On the one hand, 
modelling the impact of carbon leakage driven relocation in more than one vulnerable sector would 
shed light on the aggregate costs of the phenomenon for OIRs. On the other hand, different policy 
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A1. Appendices: model 
This appendix presents an algebraic summary of the static general equilibrium model used and 
its equations. The general equilibrium can be described by a set of rational economic agents - 
households and firms - that demand and supply different goods, behave rationally, and solve their own 
optimization problems.  
Three classes of conditions characterise a  competitive equilibrium: zero profit conditions, 
market clearance conditions and income balance conditions. Producers operate under full competition 
and maximise profit subject to current technology. Under constant returns to scale net profits are zero; 
the value of output has to equal the value of all inputs used (zero profit condition). Consumers have an 
initial endowment of factors and maximise utility subject to the budget constraint; the value of income 
must equal the total value of expenditures (income balance condition). Finally, equilibrium is 
characterised by a set of equilibrium prices such that demand equals supply for all commodities 
simultaneously (market clearance condition). In this situation agents cannot do better by altering their 
behaviour. Differentiating the profit and utility functions with respect to input and output prices 
provides compensated demand and supply coefficients (Shephard’s lemma), which appear 
subsequently in the market clearance conditions.  
For the sake of simplicity, we do not write down the explicit functional forms but instead use the 
acronyms: LT (Leontief); CD (Cobb-Douglas), CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) and CET 
(Constant Elasticity of Transformation) to indicate the class of functional form in place. This form of 
presenting an AGE follows the approach of Dellink et al (2004). The model is programmed using 
GAMS/MPSGE language and resolved with the PATH algorithm. 
 








                                                   
12 Equation 1 depicts these functions in a shortened form, via inputs and elasticities. For instance, a CES function 
for a case with two levels of nesting and two inputs takes the following form: on the first level: 
1 11
1 2 11 22 ( , ;) ( ) Y CES X X a X a X
σσ σσ σ σ σ
− −− = = +  and on the second level: 
1 11
2 3 4 33 44 ( , ;) ( ) X CES X X a X a X
ψψ ψψ ψ ψ ψ
− −− = = + , where a1, a2, a3, a4 are parameters and σ ,ψ represent 
the elasticities of substitutions between the inputs. By substituting X2 in function Y we can envisage the length 
of the output functions proposed.  
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Zero profit conditions: 
  (Ec. 2) 
Consumers 
Utility function for representative consumer  
  (Ec. 3) 
Income balance: 
  (Ec. 4) 
Government 
Expenditure function  
  (Ec. 5) 
Income balance: 
  (Ec. 6) 
The Foreign Sector 
Total supply from import and production of goods 
  (Ec. 7) 
Total supply from import and production of goods 
  (Ec. 8) 
Closure rule 
  (Ec. 9) 
Market Balance          
 
  (Ec. 11) 26 
 
  (Ec. 12) 
  (Ec. 13) 
  (Ec. 14) 
        
A.1.2 Additional equations for policy simulations 
 
Emission restriction 
  (Ec. 10) 
 
  (Ec. 19) 
 
Iron and Steel industry relocation modeling 
  (Ec. 20) 
 
  (Ec. 21.1) 
 
  (Ec. 21.2) 
 







Label  Entries  Description 
j, jj  1,...,J  Sectors, Intermediate Inputs or Goods  
e  Coal, Oil, Gas  Fossil fuels 
 
Parameters 
Label  Description 
  Tax rate on labour, sector j 
  Tax rate on capital , sector j 
  CO2 emission coefficients for fuels 
  Elasticity of substitution between inputs 
  Exogenous restriction in emission permits 
  Exogenous restriction in output from Iron and Steel Industry sector 
 
Variables  
Name  Description     
  Output of sector j     Private consumption of good j  
  Intermediate demand for input jj in sector j     Public consumption of good j 
  Domestic demand for good j     Savings 
  Total supply of good j     Investment in sector j  
  Total demand for good j     Equilibrium market price of good j  
  Imports of good j     Equilibrium market price of capital  
  Exports of good j     Equilibrium real exchange rate price  
  Demand for capital of sector j     Equilibrium market price of investment  
  Demand for labour of sector j     CO2 emissions by producers 
  Utility of representative consumer     Total CO2 emissions 28 
 
A2. Appendices: data 
Table A1: Sectoral Desegregation 
Sector Description  Acronym 
Symmetric IO 
Table  CNAE Code 
A-84 Code 
Agriculture  Y1  1.-4  A+B 
Coal  Y2  5  CA:10 
Oil & gas extraction  Y3  6  CA:11 
Mineral extraction  Y4  7.-9  CA:12, CB 
Food and textile industry  Y5  10.-19  DA+DB+DC 
Wood & paper industry   Y6  20-22  DD+DE 
Oil refining industry  Y7  23  DF 
Chemical industry  Y8  24-28  DG+DH 
Glass industry  Y9  29  DI:26.1 
Cement industry  Y10  30  DI:26.5 
Iron and Steel industry  Y11  32-34  DJ:27 
Metal products industry  Y12  35,36,37, 38  DJ:28 
Other industries  Y13  31,39-51  DI+DK+DL+DM+DN 
Electricity  Y14  52  E40.1 
Natural gas  Y15  53  E40.2, E40.3 
Construction  Y16  54,55  E:41+F 
Transport  Y17  60-66  I 
Commercial services  Y18  56-59, 67-74  G,H,J,K 
Non commercial services  Y19  75-88  L,M,N,O,P,Q 
Source: Own work 29 
 
Table A2: SAM, Basque Country 2005 (M€) 
 
Source: Own work based on Eustat (2009) 
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 Y12 Y13 Y14 Y15 Y16 Y17 Y18 Y19 C G I M X Tot
Y1 580 0 0 0 -795 -192 0 -11 0 0 0 0 -4 0 0 -30 0 -272 -22 -1143 0 -17 2029 -123 0
Y2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -46 0 0 -25 -22 0 -3 -60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 156 0 0
Y3 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2738 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -867 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3607 0 0
Y4 -1 0 0 145 -6 -3 0 -22 -5 -11 -27 -4 -172 0 0 -319 -1 -5 0 0 0 -3 461 -27 0
Y5 -45 0 0 0 3071 -6 0 -19 0 0 -3 -3 -40 0 0 -2 -6 -1112 -118 -3995 0 -104 4080 -1697 0
Y6 -1 0 0 -1 -72 2011 0 -54 -11 -1 -22 -50 -265 -6 -3 -132 -47 -488 -177 -329 0 -24 1215 -1545 0
Y7 -70 0 0 -1 -2 -2 3749 -4 0 -1 -4 -1 -4 -60 -3 0 -799 -13 -8 -984 0 -55 271 -2010 0
Y8 -28 0 0 -4 -51 -113 -20 3028 -16 -1 -90 -146 -644 -2 -2 -225 -32 -174 -213 -515 -336 -15 2923 -3327 0
Y9 0 0 0 0 -49 -1 0 -15 306 0 0 -7 -106 0 0 -70 -4 -6 -4 -8 0 -16 203 -223 0
Y10 0 0 0 -3 0 -2 0 -1 0 172 -12 -2 -92 0 0 -371 -3 -2 -1 0 0 0 343 -25 0
Y11 0 0 0 -1 -5 -3 0 -60 0 -3 3888 -1874 -1745 0 0 -310 -2 -21 -3 0 0 -48 4911 -4722 0
Y12 -1 0 0 -1 -57 -26 -1 -59 -3 -1 -260 6209 -1174 0 -3 -679 -9 -47 -21 -76 0 -927 1399 -4261 0
Y13 -24 0 0 -10 -32 -61 -15 -83 -12 -4 -325 -158 11695 -53 -5 -2195 -147 -764 -148 -1105 -2 -4302 7254 -9504 0
Y14 0 0 0 -5 -39 -62 -23 -94 -10 -7 -260 -96 -119 2065 -6 -126 -79 -333 -146 -639 0 0 10 -32 0
Y15 0 0 0 -3 -16 -65 -251 -47 -49 -10 -115 -17 -34 -604 1308 0 0 -22 -19 -56 0 0 0 0 0
Y16 -4 0 0 -5 -26 -17 -8 -38 -2 -3 -35 -53 -78 -24 -4 11599 -112 -2219 -274 -812 0 -7887 0 0 0
Y17 -17 0 0 -18 -134 -129 -35 -215 -28 -6 -274 -223 -460 -27 -12 -305 6104 -1333 -375 -1898 -76 -585 1586 -1540 0
Y18 -38 0 0 -13 -670 -335 -96 -598 -32 -11 -812 -840 -2096 -183 -70 -1865 -1061 27317 -1413 -14725 -266 -1975 4861 -5076 0
Y19 -3 0 0 0 -5 -4 -3 -8 0 0 -7 -10 -32 -3 -2 -59 -47 -215 11285 -5077 -6057 -73 345 -24 0
L -59 0 0 -18 -425 -494 -47 -727 -65 -17 -745 -1513 -2345 -120 -22 -2338 -995 -6700 -5106 21735 0 0 0 0 0
K -274 0 0 -53 -551 -348 -393 -679 -52 -63 -597 -783 -1559 -786 -284 -1719 -2246 -11187 -1498 23072 0 0 0 0 0
Taxk 0 0 0 -3 -19 -15 -62 -94 -3 -4 -42 -12 -56 -91 -21 -202 -185 -521 -302 0 1632 0 0 0 0
Taxl -18 0 0 -5 -116 -135 -12 -198 -19 -5 -236 -417 -667 -45 -5 -652 -329 -1883 -1438 0 6180 0 0 0 0
T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1074 -1074 0 0 0 0
Bal. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1515 0 0 -35653 34137 0
S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -16033 0 16033 0 0 0
Tot 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 030 
 
Table A3: Final energy consumption by sectors (ktoe), 2005 
   Coal  Oil  Gas  Electricity 
Agriculture  0  50  0  4 
Coal  0  0  0  0 
Oil & gas extraction  0  0  0  0 
Mineral extraction  0  2  6  3 
Food and textile industry  0  5  34  28 
Wood & paper industry   0  5  153  98 
Oil refining industry  550  450  5  0 
Chemical industry  0  95  104  129 
Glass industry  0  1  115  15 
Cement industry  101  3  22  21 
Iron and Steel industry  110  8  275  514 
Metal products industry  0  2  40  60 
Other industries  13  10  78  81 
Electricity  349  131  1386  0 
Natural gas  0  5  0  15 
Construction  0  1  0  9 
Transport  0  1777  0  18 
Commercial services  0  31  55  175 
Non commercial services  0  18  45  101 
Total  1123  2594  2318  1271 
 
Source: Eustat (2009)  
Table A4: Standard emission factors by fossil fuel (ktCO2/ktoe) 
Fossil Fuels   
Coal   4,032 
Oil   3,207 
Gas   2,337 
 
Source: IEA (2008)  
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Table A5: Production, consumption and emission by sectors, 2005 
Sector  
Output  Consumption  CO2 emissions 
(M€)  (%)  (M€)  (%)  (KtCO2)   (%) 
Agriculture  580  0.5%  1143  3.6%  160  1.0% 
Coal  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
Oil & gas extraction  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
Mineral extraction  145  0.1%  0  0.0%  20  0.1% 
Food and textile industry  3071  2.9%  3995  12.7%  95  0.6% 
Wood & paper industry   2011  1.9%  329  1.0%  374  2.2% 
Oil refining industry  3749  3.5%  984  3.1%  2218  13.2% 
Chemical industry  3028  2.9%  515  1.6%  548  3.3% 
Glass industry  306  0.3%  8  0.0%  272  1.6% 
Cement industry  3888  3.7%  0  0.0%  468  2.8% 
Iron and Steel industry  6209  5.9%  0  0.0%  1112  6.6% 
Metal products industry  11695  11.0%  76  0.2%  100  0.6% 
Other industries  11695  11.0%  1105  3.5%  267  1.6% 
Electricity  2065  1.9%  639  2.0%  5066  30.1% 
Natural gas  1308  1.2%  56  0.2%  16  0.1% 
Construction  11599  10.9%  812  2.6%  3  0.0% 
Transport  6104  5.8%  1898  6.1%  5699  33.9% 
Commercial services  27317  25.8%  14725  47.0%  228  1.4% 
Non commercial services  11285  10.6%  5077  16.2%  163  1.0% 
Total  106055  100%  31363  100%  16809  100% 
 








Table A6: Elasticities of substitution in production, trade and consumption 
  Elasticity of substitution between material inputs and Capital-Labour-Energy  0 
  Elasticity of substitution between Capital-Labour and Energy  0.5 
  Elasticity of substitution between Capital and Labour  1 
  Elasticity of substitution between Electricity and Fossil Fuels  0.5 
  Elasticity of substitution between Coal, Oil and Gas  1 
  Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods  3 
  Elasticity of transformation between domestic goods and exports  3 
  Elasticity of substitution between consumption of energy and non energy goods  0.5 
  Elasticity of substitution in consumption of energy goods   1 
  Elasticity of substitution in consumption of non energy goods   1 
Source: MIT-EPPA Babiker et al. (2005) 
Table A7: European Old Industrial Region designation 
Old industrial region   NUTS 2 region 
NUTS 2 
code 
Ruhr  Dusseldorf  DEA1 
   Munster  DEA3 
   Arnsberg   DEA5 
Saar   Saarland   DEC0 
North-east France   Picardie  FR22 
   Nord-Pas-de-Calais  FR30 
   Lorraine   FR41 
Basque Country   Pais Vasco  ES21 
UK coalfields   Tees Valley and Durham   UKC1 
   Northumberland, Tyne and Wear  UKC2 
   Lancashire   UKD4 
   South Yorkshire  UKE3 
   Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire  UKF1 
   Shropshire and Staffordshire   UKG2 
   West Wales and The Valleys   UKL1 
   South Western Scotland   UKM3 
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